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EVIDENCE DESTROYED, INNOCENCE LOST:
THE PRESERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE UNDER
INNOCENCE PROTECTION STATUTES
Cynthia E. Jones*
In 1997, Texas governor George W. Bush issued a pardon to Kevin Byrd, a man
convicted of sexually assaulting a pregnant woman while her two-year old
daughter lay asleep beside her.' As part of the original criminal investigation, a
medical examination was performed on the victim and bodily fluids from the rapist
were collected for forensic analysis in a "rape kit." At the time of Mr. Byrd's trial
in 1985, DNA technology was not yet available for forensic analysis of biological
evidence.2 In 1997, however, a comparison of Mr. Byrd's DNA with the bodily
fluid in the rape kit established that Mr. Byrd was not the rapist. 3 After serving
twelve years in prison, Mr. Byrd finally was exonerated because of the scientific
advancements in DNA technology and the fact that, by "pure luck," the sample of
biological material collected in the rape kit had been preserved at the Harris
County Clerk's Office in Houston, Texas for over a decade.4
After the DNA tests excluded Kevin Byrd as the perpetrator, the prosecution and
the police were convinced that Mr. Byrd was innocent.5 When Governor Bush
issued the pardon, he predicted that Mr. Byrd's case would be the "first of many" in
Texas to use the new DNA technology to re-examine old cases. 6 The same week of
Mr. Byrd's pardon, however, the evidence custodians at the Harris County Clerk's
* Professor Cynthia Ellen Jones is an Assistant Professor of Law at the American University, Washington
College of Law. Professor Jones is a former staff attorney and the former Executive Director of the Public
Defender Service for the District of Columbia. I would like to dedicate this article to the memory of my wonderful
mother, Ernestine C. Jones, who continues to inspire me. Also, it "takes a village" to create a law review article,
and I would like to thank all of my "village people": a very special thanks to my colleague, my mentor, and very
dear friend, Professor Angela J. Davis, who continually motivated me in this creation: Professor Tamar Meekins,
for her incredible friendship and support; my dedicated research assistants who gave me invaluable assistance on
this journey: Addy Schmidt, Rolaine Bancroft, Joseph Caleb, Nana Amoako, Keir Bancroft, Holly Daee, Natalia
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I. Claudia Kolker, DNA Tests Can Free Wrongly Convicted ifEvidence Survives; Sample That Helped Kevin
Byrd Almost Thrown Out of Warehouse, Hous. CHRON., Oct. 13, 1997, at 25A.
2. See Lauren Kern. Innocence Lost? Despite its Increasing Importance, DNA Evidence Routinely Gets
Destroyed Here, HOUST. PRESS, Nov. 30, 2000 (noting that the widespread use of DNA evidence in rape and
murder cases began in 1996); see also infra note 18.
3. Proof Clearing Man Almost Tossed Out, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Oct. 14, 1997, at B3 [hereinafter Proof
Almost Tossed Out].
4. Kolker, supra note 1, at 25A.
5. Jim Dwyer, W Soft on Napping Lawyers, DNA, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 5, 2000, at 8.
6. Id.
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office began to systematically destroy old rape kits in its evidence storage facility.
7
In one fell swoop, fifty rape kits were discarded, 8 virtually guaranteeing that Kevin
Byrd would not be the "first of many" in Harris County to benefit from DNA
technology as was predicted by Governor Bush.
The sole reason given by Harris County for the destruction of this potentially
exculpatory evidence was a simple lack of storage space. 9 While it seemed more
than a little coincidental that evidence kept for a decade or longer was suddenly
destroyed on the immediate heels of Mr. Byrd's exoneration, evidence custodians
were quick to point out that destruction of the evidence was legal.' In fact, local
law gave Harris County the complete discretion to either retain or destroy old
evidence from closed cases, regardless of any potential value the evidence might
have in establishing the actual innocence of a prisoner.''
To date, 163 innocent people in nearly every jurisdiction in the country have
been wrongly convicted and later exonerated, many as a result of DNA analysis
performed on old evidence retained by the government. 2 A major impediment to
the use of DNA evidence to exonerate the wrongly convicted has been-and
continues to be-the destruction of evidence, such as rape kits, by the govern-
ment.' 3 Innocence Project attorneys and others working on behalf of the convicted
describe the problem as a race to see how many people can be proven innocent
before the evidence samples are lost or destroyed. 14 In fact, the Innocence Project
7. Kolker, supra note I, at 25A.
8. See id; see also Dwyer, supra note 5, at 8.
9. Kolker, supra note 1, at 25A.
10. See id.; see also ProofAlmost Tossed Out, supra note 3, at B3; see also Kern, supra note 2 (discussing the
then-existing state law that mandated retention of evidence for only two years after final convictions in
non-capital felony cases with sentences of five years or more).
1l. See Kolker, supra note 1, at 33A; see also ProofAlmost Tossed Out, supra note 3, at B3 (quoting a court
official stating that evidence collected in non-capital felony cases is required to be retained for only two years
after the case closed; then, pursuant to local practices, the prosecutor has the discretion to "sign off' on destruction
or authorize retention).
12. Innocence Project, Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Oct.
11, 2005). According to the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern University School of Law, there
have been wrongly convicted persons exonerated in forty-three states, as well as the District of Columbia and the
federal court system. Center on Wrongful Convictions, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/clinic/wrongful
exonerations/States.htm (last visited Sept. 24, 2005). The only states where there have been no reported
exonerations to date are Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, Rhode Island and
Wyoming. See generally Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 555-60 (2005) (listing DNA and non-DNA-based exonerations by state in all
jurisdictions from 1989 through 2003).
13. See, e.g., Ted S. Reed, Freeing the Innocent: A Proposed Forensic Evidence Retention Statute to Optimize
Utah's Post-Conviction DNA Testing Act for Claims of Actual Innocence, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 877, 882-84
(discussing the pervasive problems of evidence destruction encountered in Utah by the Rocky Mountain
Innocence Center); see also cases discussed infra note 22.
14. Morning Edition: DNA Testing in Crime Cases Causing Distrust in the Criminal Justice System (NPR
radio broadcast Aug. 29, 2000) (quoting Peter Neufeld, Co-Founder, Innocence Project, Cardozo Law School:
"[w]e are in a race right now against all these police departments who are destroying the evidence.") [hereinafter
NPR, DNA Testing in Crime Cases].
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of the Benjamin Cardozo School of Law, the national leader in the use of DNA to
exonerate wrongly convicted prisoners, reports that 75% of the cases it accepts
cannot go forward because the evidence has been lost or destroyed.' 5
While the practice of destroying old evidence in closed criminal cases was a
routine and benign practice prior to the widespread forensic use of DNA, the
current practice of destroying biological evidence, with full knowledge of its
potential use to exonerate the wrongly convicted, is a cruel and callous injustice.
This article provides a critical analysis of the government's duty to preserve
potentially exculpatory evidence under innocence protection statutes, newly en-
acted laws that allow prisoners to pursue DNA testing on biological evidence to
establish their actual innocence. Part I examines the scope of the government's
duty to preserve evidence under state law, the United States Constitution and
innocence protection statutes. While innocence protection statutes have advanced
the efforts of prisoners to utilize DNA testing to establish actual innocence, the
vast majority of these statutes do not mandate that the government preserve the
biological evidence needed for DNA analysis. Thus, the right to post-conviction
DNA testing created by the overwhelming majority of innocence protection
statutes is purely illusory. Moreover, even when innocence protection statutes
impose a duty on the government to preserve evidence, the statutes do not include
any remedy for convicted prisoners if all testable evidence is nonetheless de-
stroyed and DNA testing is no longer possible. In order to truly protect the
innocent-the group of people for whom these remedial statutes were enacted-
innocence protection statutes must recognize and remedy the harm suffered by
prisoners who have been permanently deprived of the only avenue for establishing
actual innocence.
Part II discusses the resistance of criminal justice officials to the duty to preserve
evidence. The most frequently cited reasons for opposing prisoner requests for
DNA testing-cost, administrative burden and finality of judgments-are largely
unfounded and mask a more fundamental disagreement over the core values of our
criminal justice system. Opponents of the duty to preserve evidence maintain that
the slim margin of error resulting in the wrongful conviction of innocent people
proves that the system, though imperfect, operates fairly and should not be further
taxed with an evidence preservation burden. Advocates of a statutory duty to
preserve evidence contend that our criminal justice system does not achieve justice
or fairness if we ever convict an innocent person and then forever foreclose the
only avenue to correct the error, even if correcting the error would be costly,
difficult to manage and contrary to the interest in finality of judgments. The
analysis concludes that the majority of innocence protection statutes are flawed
15. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 19 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE (1996) [hereinafter Convicted by
Juries], available at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf; see also Sharon Cohen, Sheer Luck Saves Some
Whose DNA Evidence Was Almost Destroyed, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Oct. 8, 2000, at back page.
2005] 1241
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1239
and fail to adequately protect the right of convicted prisoners to post-conviction
DNA testing.
I. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE PRESERVATION
A. Traditional State Evidence Preservation Practices
Every jurisdiction has some form of evidence management policy or practice
that establishes the procedures for storing physical evidence collected by the
government in criminal cases, including various forms of biological evidence like
rape kits, samples of hair, saliva, and semen. Commonly, evidence management
policies designate an evidence custodian, set forth how long evidence must be
preserved, and establish the procedures to be followed before destroying old
evidence in closed criminal cases. 16 Evidence management policies are a vital tool
in the justice system for ensuring that physical evidence can be retrieved and used
at trial and will be available if there is a re-trial or other post-conviction litigation.
As well, evidence management policies promote administrative efficiency by
ridding overcrowded evidence storage facilities of old evidence from closed cases
and in creating space for new evidence collected in open investigations and
pending pretrial cases. 
17
Prior to the 1990s when advancements in DNA technology first made it possible
to extract and analyze biological material from old pieces of evidence, 18 rape kits
and blood-stained clothing had minimal use after the defendant was convicted and
the litigation was concluded in the case.' 9 As a result, there was no compelling
16. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
18. DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) is the unique genetic code found in almost all biological material in humans.
See Automated DNA Typing: Method of the Future? NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE RESEARCH PREVIEW (Nat'l
Inst. of Justice, Wash. D.C.) Feb. 1997. In 1989, the forensic use of DNA evidence to establish identity began to
gain widespread acceptance in the criminal justice system. See BARRY SCHECK & PETER NEUFELD, WRONGLY
CONVICTED, PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 241 (Saundra D. Westervelt & John A. Humphrey eds., Rutgers
University Press 2001). At that time, the state-of-the-art DNA analysis was a method called restriction fragment
length polymorphism (RFLP). Id. at 242. The RFLP analysis was of limited utility in criminal investigations,
however, because it required a large amount of pure and properly preserved biological material, a relatively
uncommon occurrence at most crime scenes. Id. Later, the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) method was
developed which could extract DNA from a very small amount of biological material and produce results from old
and degraded samples. Id. By 1996, the third generation of DNA testing, short tandem repeats (STR), was
developed. Id. at 243. This methodology, a form of PCR, has much greater accuracy and allows scientists, for the
first time, to input the DNA profile (genetic markers) in a databank and determine whether the DNA profile
matches anyone else in the databank. Id. Similarly, the third generation of DNA technology has made it possible to
test small amounts of previously untestable biological material contained in old rape kits to determine whether the
prisoner is actually innocent. Id.; see generally Keith A. Findley, New Laws Reflect the Power and Potential of
DNA, 75 WIs. LAW. 20,57 (May 2002) (discussing the evolution of DNA technology from RFLP to PCR/STR and
mitochondrial DNA testing).
19. See NPR, DNA Testing in Crime Cases, supra note 14. (quoting Chris Asplen, National Commission on the
Future of DNA Evidence: "[In the 1980s] there was no reason to keep this [old] evidence around any longer
because we didn't know about DNA. We didn't know that you could retest a biological sample from a crime scene
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reason to preserve physical evidence, and not much attention was paid to how and
where evidence was kept in the criminal justice system. In the last decade,
however, formerly useless physical evidence from closed criminal cases has
become vitally important in proving, to a scientific certainty, that innocent people
have been wrongly convicted. This has resulted in an increased focus on evidence
management practices across the country by innocence projects and other advo-
cates seeking to use the new DNA technology on old evidence to exonerate
wrongly convicted prisoners. In searching evidence storage facilities across the
country, prisoner advocates have found that the actual "management" of evidence
is, at best, inefficient and, at worst, nonexistent. Over the last few years, there have
been numerous reports from all across the country of lost or destroyed evidence in
both pretrial, open criminal cases, 20 and in post-conviction, closed cases where the
missing evidence might have been used to exonerate a wrongly convicted
21prisoner.
1
Because there are no uniform, national standards governing the retention of
evidence, evidence management policies vary widely from state to state and from
10, 15, 20 years later to determine whether or not someone was actually innocent. So that's part of what went into
those destruction policies.").
20. E.g., Walt Philbin, N. O. Police Want Lee s DNA to Investigate Local Killings, TIMS-PICAYUNE, May 29,
2003, at 1 (during a recent cleaning of the New Orleans Police Department evidence room, evidence destroyed in
as many as 100 cases); Tasgola Karla Bruner, Detective Accused of Destroying Rape Evidence, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL CONSTITUTION, Apr. 5, 2003, at 3H; Michael Perlstein, Evidence Missing at NOPD Storage; Items Lost,
Destroyed in Cleaning of Room, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Feb. 4, 2003 (during a "routine purge of evidence" in a police
property room, thousands of items of evidence destroyed, including rape kits in still-open cases); Steve Berry,
Disposal of DNA Leads to Review Policy: Rape Survivors and Police Rethink Limit for Keeping Evidence, Los
ANGELES TIMES, Aug. 18, 2002, at B I (noting police department destroyed over 1,000 rape kits); Steve Berry,
Biological Crime Evidence May Be Missing, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 3, 2002 at 5; Jim DiPalma, Boynton Police
Missing Drug Evidence, SUN SENTINEL, Apr. 24, 1996 at 3B; Jim Stingl, Evidence in Rape Case is Destroyed,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL, Apr. 7, 1992, at B5.
21. See Gregory D. Kesich, Inmate's Fight for Freedom: Supporters of Convicted Murderer Dennis Dechaine
hope to use DNA evidence as basis of requesting a new trial, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (MAINE), Apr. 6, 2003, at
1A (advocating on behalf of the convicted prisoner discovered that most of the biological evidence collected in the
case had been thrown away four years after the conviction); See also Phillip Pina, Missing Evidence Leads to New
Storage Policies, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 14, 2002, at 14A (stating that "biological evidence was likely
destroyed during routine disposal of old evidence from the court's evidence vault and police property room"
before defendant could obtain DNA testing) [hereinafter Missing Evidence]; Associated Press, Destruction of
Evidence Thwarts DNA Appeal, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 10, 2002, at B4 (finding that three years after the defendant's
trial, biological evidence was destroyed according to "normal procedures" before defendant could secure DNA
analysis); Mitchel Maddux, Old DNA Evidence Often Destroyed by State New Testing Policy is Immaterial for
Some, THE RECORD (BERGEN COUNTY, NJ), Jun. 19, 2001, at A03 (according to a New Jersey prosecutor most
inmates seeking post-conviction DNA testing will find that the old evidence has long since been destroyed);
Andrew Smith, DA's Crusade on DNA/Catterson Seeks Review to Aid Wrongly Convicted, NEWSDAY, Dec. 20,
2000, at A04 (New York prosecutor-initiated review of old convictions identified two cases where biological
evidence existed at the time of the original trial, but DNA testing thwarted because evidence had since been
destroyed); NPR, DNA Testing in Crime Cases, supra note 14, at I ("Police and courts across the country are
destroying the biological evidence that could determine whether a person has been wrongly convicted").
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courthouse to courthouse within each state.22 Evidence management policies can
be governed by state statutes, local court rules, police department operating
procedures, and unwritten practices and customs. 23 In some jurisdictions, the
evidence management practice mandates retention of old evidence at the court-
house and designates court clerks or court reporters to serve as the custodians of
the evidence until a judge signs an order authorizing destruction. 24 Other jurisdic-
tions, like Harris County, Texas, require that the evidence be maintained by the
police department or at the state forensics lab until the proscribed retention period
has lapsed, after which time a prosecutor or a police official can make the
discretionary choice to retain the evidence or authorize destruction.25
22. See Reed, supra note 13, at 880 (finding that there are no statewide evidence retention laws in Utah and
retention practices vary widely throughout the state); Kreimer & Rudovsky, "Double Helix, Double Bind, Factual
Innocence and Post Conviction DNA Testing," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 547, 554 (2002) (stating that the disposition of
physical evidence after trial is left to prosecutors, police officers in evidence rooms and court clerks); Confronting
the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1567 (1995) (noting that many jurisdictions
follow some form of preservation practice, though not uniform nor generally regulated by state or federal laws).
See also Laura Maggi, DNA Tests for inmates elusive despite law, La. Fund lacks cash; evidence hard to find,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 16, 2002 at I (stating that biological evidence in Louisiana is hard to find
because it could be located with the court clerk, the crime lab, the sheriff's office or the police department);
Dianne Molvig, Freeing the Innocent, 74 APR Wlsc. LAWYER 14, 57 (2001) (according to Barry Scheck, around
the country there are a hodgepodge of evidence management policies and, in some places, there is no policy at
all); Missing Evidence, supra note 21, at 14A (stating that in Ramsey County, Minnesota, some evidence is
retained at the courthouse, other evidence is sent back to the police department in a "completely random"
fashion); Mark Hansen, DNA Bill of Rights: Activists call for standards in inmate testing, evidence preservation,
86 A.B.A.J. 30 (2000) (stating that there are no uniform standards as to how long biological evidence should be
kept, additionally different places have different policies and practices).
23. E.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 2.21(0 (Vernon 2003) (stating a court clerk has the authority to
dispose of exhibits after trial); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 165.81 (West 1998) (regulating the retention and disposal of
physical and biological evidence by the state Department of Justice); Vardas v. City of Dallas, No. 3-02-CV-
0504-D, 2002 WL 911776 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 29, 2002) (finding evidence destroyed by the Dallas Police department
pursuant to a city ordinance); People v. Walker, 628 N.E.2d 971,973 (I11. App. Ct 1993) (noting that the Chicago
police officers who destroyed the evidence were not acting in accord with police department general orders).
24. See, e.g., Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866 (2000), 585 S.E.2d 801 (2003); Lovitt v. True, 330 F.
Supp. 2d 603, 610, 629 (2004), aff'd, 403 F.3d 171 (2005) (stating that a court clerk destroyed evidence to make
storage space after a judge signed an order authorizing the destruction), discussed supra note 48; State v. Brown,
613 S.E.2d 284, 285 (N.C. App. 2005) (finding that the same day defendant was convicted of rape, judge signed
"order for Disposition of Physical Evidence" directing police to dispose of all evidence, including victim's
clothing which could have contained biological material).
25. See, e.g, Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp.2d 756, 761 (E.D.Va.), aff'd, Cherrix v. Braxton, 258 F.3d 250,
254 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing the medical examiner's regular office policy of destroying biological evidence at
the direction of the state prosecutor's office); FRONTLINE: What Jennifer Saw (PBS television broadcast Feb. 25,
1997), available at www.frontline.orgwww.frontline.orgpbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/dna/etc/script.html
(stating that the rape kit collected in the case of Ronald Cotton was not destroyed during the eleven years he was
wrongly convicted solely because the detective assigned to the case unilaterally decided to keep it); Kolker, DNA
tests, supra note I (stating that the prosecutor presented with a list of closed cases slated for evidence destruction
unilaterally decided to preserve the rape kit that was later used to exonerate Kevin Byrd); People v. Cress, 645
N.W.2d 669 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002) (stating the prosecutor signed a "routine" evidence destruction order
authorizing the police department evidence custodians to dispose of the evidence, including all of the biological
evidence) (discussed infra at n. 44); Berry, supra note 20, at 5 (finding destruction of evidence authorized by the
Los Angeles detectives investigating the case).
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Even when a jurisdiction has an established evidence management policy in
place, the retention of physical evidence is still largely a function of luck and
26 Pioe doae aethappenstance. Prisoner advocates have discovered that, contrary to the evidence
management policy, some evidence within the same facility is kept for decades and
other evidence is destroyed weeks after the case is closed.27 Moreover, without an
efficient system for cataloging and tracking evidence, it is often nearly impossible
to locate evidence years after the case is closed. "Formerly lost" biological
evidence subsequently used to exonerate innocent prisoners has been fortuitously
discovered years later at various locations inside the courthouse,28 in closed files at
the state forensics lab, 29 in a storage closet in the prosecutor's office, 30and even in
a garbage dumpster.3' In the case of Kirk Bloodsworth, the first death row inmate
exonerated with DNA evidence, the biological evidence of the rape-murder that
could have been legally destroyed after his conviction was affirmed had been
saved by the judge in his chambers to prevent destruction.32
In sum, although it is now well-established that old, formerly useless biological
evidence is now essential in post-conviction DNA testing to establish actual
innocence, the government is not required under most state laws to preserve
26. Molvig, supra note 22 (stating that according to Barry Scheck some evidence custodians simply forget to
throw away evidence).
27. Cohen, supra note 15 (stating that an innocence advocate seeking biological evidence on behalf of an
inmate learned that evidence kept for twenty-seven years had been discarded to save storage space just two
months prior to the request for DNA testing); NPR, DNA Testing in Crime Cases, supra note 14 (stating Kerry
Kotler was exonerated after seventeen years in prison because a court clerk "neglected" to destroy one box of
evidence after Kotler's post-conviction appeals were exhausted).
28. TARYN SIMON, THE INNOCENTS 70, 94 (Lesley A. Martin ed., Umbrage Editions 2003) (stating that in the
case of Larry Mayes, "for years" the biological evidence was reported lost, but eventually discovered by a court
clerk. In Kenneth Waters' case, his sister located the formerly lost biological evidence in the courthouse); Connie
Schultz, Knowledge is Power: Michael Gets an Education in Prison as His Stepdad Seeks Evidence to Free Him,
THE PLAIN DEALER (CLEV.), Oct. 14, 2002, at CI (stating that after an exhaustive search for biological evidence
with court, prosecutor. and lab, evidence located in a box in the basement of the courthouse).
29. E.g., Simon, supra note 28, at 88 (stating that after many years of trying to locate missing biological
evidence, Marvin Anderson was finally exonerated when it was discovered that the lab technician who analyzed
the biological evidence in his case just happened to keep a portion of the biological material in her archived files);
Tim McGlone, State Scientist's habit of Saving Evidence Led to DNA Testing, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 13, 2003
at A4 (stating that Julius Earl Ruffin was exonerated because the forensic scientist from the state lab, in direct
violation of lab protocols, preserved a portion of the biological material collected in his case). Tom Bailey, Jr.,
Offices Work on Keeping DNA-Laden Evidence; Agencies Strive for Ways to Maintain Chain of Custody on Rape
Kits, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (MEMPHIS), June 9, 2002 at B2 (stating that Clark McMillan exonerated after
twenty-two years in prison because of lab policy to preserve all forensic evidence).
30. Paul J. Passanante, Innocence Project Unfairly Assails Joyce; Circuit Attorney Never Opposed DNA
Testing in This Case and Did Nothing to Delay it, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 6, 2002, at B7 (stating that after
evidence reported lost, a pipe burst in the prosecutor's office and evidence collected in Larry Johnson's case was
found in a closet during the clean up).
31. Cohen, supra note 15 (stating Calvin Johnson freed because prosecutors took rape kit out of garbage can
where it had been discarded by ajudge's clerk who was cleaning out the judge's office).
32. TIM JUNKIN, BLOODSWORTH: THE TRUE STORY OF THE FIRST DEATH Row INMATE EXONERATED BY DNA 245
(Algonquin Books 2004) (stating that the judge had been uncomfortable with the outcome of the case and decided
to keep some of the trial exhibits to prevent destruction).
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biological evidence collected in criminal cases.3 3 Without an innocence protection
statute mandating retention of evidence, critical biological evidence can be legally
destroyed pursuant to the evidence management policies in the jurisdiction.34
B. The Constitutional Duty to Preserve Evidence
While state laws traditionally have not mandated preservation of biological
evidence, the Supreme Court has recognized that intentional destruction of
evidence collected in criminal cases could potentially violate the constitutional
right to due process. In a series of cases that fall under the umbrella of "constitu-
tionally guaranteed access to evidence," 35 the United States Supreme Court has
held that destruction or non-disclosure of evidence that the government knows to
be exculpatory and material to the defense violates due process.36 The Supreme
Court has articulated a very different standard, however, when the defendant seeks
the protection of the due process clause for "potentially exculpatory" evidence. In
Arizona v. Youngblood,37 the Court in 1989 recognized that "whenever potentially
exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of
divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often,
disputed. ' 38 The Court stated that "the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary
material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to
tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant" does not establish
a due process violation unless the defendant can show bad faith on the part of the
police in destroying the evidence. 39 The Court further held that a due process
violation will only be found where the exculpatory value of the evidence was
"apparent before the evidence was destroyed. 4 °
In the years since Youngblood, the requirement of demonstrating "bad faith" has
proven to be an almost insurmountable burden in establishing a due process
violation based on the destruction of evidence. 4 ' A few courts have found a due
process violation when the government has destroyed the only evidence of the
33. Reed, supra note 13, at 879-80, 884-85.
34. See, e.g., Murphy v. State, III S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex. App. 2003) (holding that the law provides no relief
when biological evidence is destroyed prior to the enactment of an innocence protection statute); Accord, Watson
v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497,499-500 (Tex. App. 2002).
35. U.S. v. Valenzuela-Bemal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982).
36. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
37. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988).
38. Id. at 57-58 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 486 (1984)).
39. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57.
40. Id. at 56-57 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 489 (1984)).
41. See, e.g., Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 580 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no due process violation because
evidence not destroyed in bad faith); DiBenedetto v. Hall, 272 F.3d 1, 12 (1 st Cir. 2001) (same); Lolly v. State, 611
A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992) (stating that "[sihort of an admission by the police, it is unlikely that a defendant would
ever be able to make the necessary showing to establish the required elements for proving bad faith.").
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defendant's guilt before trial and still proceeds with the prosecution. Other courts
have found that the government did not act in bad faith even when evidence is
destroyed in violation of the local evidence management policy.4 3 Courts have also
refused to find bad faith where, notwithstanding the existence of independent
exculpatory evidence, the government authorizes the destruction of all remaining
biological evidence. 44 As a result, legal commentators have not been optimistic
that the government's failure to preserve untested, "potentially exculpatory"
biological evidence needed for post-conviction DNA analysis will constitute a
violation of due process.4 5
More recently, however, there has been a growing consensus and optimism
among legal scholars that the widespread use of DNA evidence in criminal cases
over the last decade will persuade courts to find due process violations when the
government intentionally destroys evidence that could have been subjected to
DNA analysis. 46 Other scholars have opined that the intentional destruction of
biological evidence in direct violation of an evidence preservation law or an
42. See, e.g., U.S. v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666, 668 (W.D. Va. 1991) (finding constitutional violation where all
drugs destroyed by government in drug possession case); accord U.S. v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 906 (10th Cir. 1994)
(finding physical evidence destroyed by government resulted in constitutional violation); State v. Blackwell, 537
S.E.2d 457,458 (Ga.App. 2000) (finding destruction of urine sample in DUI case violated due process); People v.
Walker, 628 N.E.2d 971 (1993) (holding that destruction of certain items of clothing constituted a denial of due
process, because clothing material to the robbery defendant's defense of misidentification).
43. Guzman v. State, 868 So.2d 498, 509 (Fla. 2003) (finding no bad faith when evidence destroyed without
written authorization as mandated by police department evidence management procedures).
44. This point is aptly made by the case of Thomas Cress. See Cress, 645 N.W. 2d 669. Cress was convicted of
the brutal rape and murder of Patricia Rosansky. There were no eyewitnesses and no physical evidence linking
Mr. Cress to the murder, but the government presented the testimony of several witnesses who claimed to have
heard Mr. Cress confess to the murder. See id. There was biological evidence, including hairs and semen stains on
the victim's clothing. Although DNA testing was not available at the time of trial in 1987, a forensic expert
testified that the hair did not belong to the victim or Mr. Cress. Years later, the defendant filed a motion for a new
trial based on the fact that several of the prosecution witnesses had recanted their trial testimony and admitted they
"conspired to lie and set up" Mr. Cress to collect reward money and the fact that another man, Michael Ronning, a
confessed serial killer, admitted to killing Patricia Rosansky. Id. at 674. After the trial court granted the motion for
a new trial, the defense learned that several years earlier, the prosecutor signed an order authorizing the state
police to destroy all physical evidence collected in the case, including the biological evidence. 1d. at 675. The
defense alleged that the destruction was in bad faith because the prosecutor knew of Ronning's confession to the
Rosanky murder five months before signing the destruction order and even after the order was signed continued to
have numerous discussions about entering into negotiations with Ronning to plead guilty to the Rosanky murder.
Id. Although the appellate court found the circumstances surrounding the prosecutor's authorization of the
evidence destruction "deeply disturbing," id. at 694, on remand, the lower court ruled that the prosecutor had not
acted in bad faith and, therefore, there was no due process violation under Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 51. The
Michigan Supreme Court let this ruling stand. People v. Cress, 664 N.W.2d 174, 181 (Mich. 2003).
45. As one commentator noted, "[e]vidence that has not been examined or tested by government agents
provides a prime example of evidence that does not have apparent exculpatory value." Elizabeth A. Bawden, Here
Today, Gone Tomorrow-Three Common Mistakes Courts Make When Police Lose or Destroy Evidence with
Apparent Exculpatory Value, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 335, 344 (2000).
46. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 22, at 587 ("In an era of universal use of DNA evidence to both implicate
and exonerate criminal suspects, it would be disingenuous for the prosecutor to claim that anything short of a truly
accidental loss was not strong evidence of bad faith."); accord Symposium, Developments in the Law-
Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV 1481, 1567 (1994-1995).
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innocence protection statute should be sufficient to establish bad faith.4 7 To date,
courts applying the Youngblood standard in post-conviction DNA testing cases
have generally not adopted either approach. 48 Thus, post-Youngblood the govern-
ment has no constitutional obligation to preserve biological evidence that could be
subjected to post-conviction testing unless it is apparent prior to destruction that
the evidence is exculpatory.
C. Evidence Preservation under Innocence Protection Statutes
1. Overview of Innocence Protection Statutes
Against the backdrop of lawful evidence destruction pursuant to evidence
management policies and the lack of any meaningful constitutional duty to
preserve evidence, legal reform was urgently needed to better protect the rights of
47. Findley, supra note 18, at 57 (stating that innocence protection acts "reflect a legislative judgment that
biological evidence has potential exculpatory value, and willful destruction of the evidence in violation of the
statute might go a long way toward establishing bad faith"); see also Lucy S. McGough, Good Enough for
Government Work: The Constitutional Duty to Preserve Forensic Interviews of Child Victims, 65 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 179, 198-99 (2002).
48. The case of Robin Lovitt provides a very poignant example of the court's reluctance to find "bad faith"
even when the government has destroyed biological evidence that was required to be preserved under a
post-conviction DNA testing statute. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866 (Va. 2000); Lovitt v. Warden
585 S.E.2d 801 (2003), aff'd, Lovitt v. True, 330 F. Supp. 2d 603 (Va. 2004), aff'd, 403 E3d 171 (4th Cir. 2005).
Robin Lovitt was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death in the state of Virginia. See
Commonwealth, 260 Va. at 501-02., 537 S.E.2d at 870. The physical evidence collected in Lovitt's case, including
evidence containing biological material, was in the custody of the clerks of the Circuit Court where Lovitt was
tried. See Warden, 266 Va. at 229, 585 S.E.2d at 808. After the death sentence was imposed, Lovitt unsuccessfully
appealed his conviction through the state appellate courts and then filed a petition for certiorari before the United
States Supreme Court. See True, 403 F.3d at 176. After Lovitt's conviction was affirmed by the Virginia Supreme
Court, but while his petition for certiorari was still pending, one of the deputy court clerks decided that the
physical evidence in Lovitt's case, including biological evidence, should be destroyed in order to create more
space in the evidence storage facility. See id. at 177, 186. Despite pleas from fellow clerks, the deputy clerk
drafted an evidence destruction order and submitted the order to a judge. See Warden, 585 S.E.2d at 809. The
judge signed the order, and all of the evidence that could have been subjected to DNA testing was destroyed. See
id. at 809. At the time the evidence was destroyed, a recently-enacted post-conviction evidence preservation
statute was in effect which mandated that, in death penalty cases, "the court that entered the judgment shall, in all
cases, order any human biological evidence or representative samples to be transferred ... to the Division of
Forensic Science [which shall] store, preserve, and retain such evidence until the judgment is executed." See id. at
809. After the evidence was destroyed, Lovitt filed a writ of habeas corpus and maintained that destruction of the
evidence in violation of the state statute constituted "bad faith" and amounted to a denial of due process. See True,
330 F. Supp. 2d at 611. Following a hearing, the Virginia Supreme Court found that although the physical
evidence containing biological material was required to be maintained under the Virginia statute, destruction of
the evidence by the deputy clerk did not entitle Lovitt to any form of relief because the clerk was not aware of the
statute at the time of destruction and, therefore, his actions were not in bad faith. See Warden, 585 S.E.2d at
808-10. This ruling, among others, was appealed to the United States Supreme Court and, on July 11, 2005, less
than five hours before his scheduled execution, the Court granted a stay of execution pending a determination of
whether the Court will review the Virginia Supreme Court's rulings. See Lovitt v. True, No. 05-5044 (U.S. July 11,
2005) (granting stay of execution pending grant of certiorari); see also Donna St. George, Va. Man Granted Stay
of Execution: High Court Agrees to Consider Case, WASH. POST, July 12, 2005, at Al. Less than three months
later certiorari was denied by the Court. Lovitt v. True, No. 05-5044 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005).
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prisoners seeking post-conviction exoneration through the use of DNA testing.
Innocence protection statutes emerged from a national reform effort. To date,
innocence protection statutes have been enacted in thirty-eight states and the
District of Columbia.4 9 In late 2004, the much-anticipated Federal Innocence
Protection statute was enacted.50 While New York and Illinois were the first
jurisdictions to have post-conviction DNA testing statutes in the 1990s, the
overwhelming majority of innocence protection statutes have been enacted since
2000. 5 1
In addition to pervasive problems of evidence destruction, prior to the passage
of innocence protection statutes, wrongly convicted prisoners seeking post-
conviction DNA testing faced the dual problems of gaining access to the evidence
for DNA testing and access to the courts to obtain judicial relief from a wrongful
conviction.52 Even if biological evidence was still in existence many years after
the original conviction and had been properly preserved by the government,
gaining access to the evidence was often extremely difficult because the evidence
was in the exclusive possession of the government. Advocates on behalf of the
convicted were forced to seek the permission of the prosecutor's office to perform
DNA analysis on the old evidence. Frequently, prosecutors recognized that
inmates had no legal right to have access to the evidence and refused to make the
evidence available for DNA testing.53 In most cases, however, recalcitrant prosecu-
tors were eventually persuaded (or pressured) to authorize the release of the
49. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240 (2004); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-201 (2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405
(2005); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-411-415 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-102jj-pp (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4504 (2004); D.C. CODE §§ 22-4131-4135 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 925.11 (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)
(2005); IDAHO CODE Ann. § 19-4902(b) (2004); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-5 (2005); IND. CODE § 35-38-7
(2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.285-7 (2004); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. § 926.1 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 2136-8 (2004); MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West
2004); MICH. COMp. LAWS § 770.16 (2005); MINN. STAT. §§ 590.01-.06 (2005); Mo. REV. STAT. § 547.035 (2004);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-110 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 29-4116-4125 (2004); NEv. REV. STAT. § 176.0918
(2003); N.H. STAT. § 651-D:1-4 (2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-la-2
(LexisNexis 2003); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269
(2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71-2953.81 (West 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 §§ 1371-1372 (West
2005); 42 PA.CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1 (West 2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 40-30-304 - 413 (2003); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 64.01-.05 (Vernon 2005): UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-35A-301-304 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2005); W.VA. CODE
§ 15-2B-14 (2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 974.07 (West 2004).
50. Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600 (2004).
51. The states that have not yet enacted an innocence protection statute are: Alabama, Alaska, Iowa, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Wyoming. Innocence protection legislation is pending in Hawaii, Massachu-
setts, Mississippi, Oregon, and South Carolina.
52. See WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED JUSTICE 244-45 (Saundra Davis Westervelt & John A.
Humphrey Rutgers University Press 2001); S. REP. No. 107-315, at 16 (2002) (discussing the impediments that
exist in gaining effective access to post-conviction DNA testing).
53. JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE
WRONGLY CONVICTED, at xvi (Doubleday 2000) (finding in approximately half of the exoneration cases described,
the prosecutor refused to make the biological evidence available until litigation was threatened or filed); see
generally Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence,
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evidence.54
Even when prisoners were able to access the evidence and secure definitive,
exculpatory DNA test results, the second problem they encountered without an
innocence protection statute was legal barriers that prevented them from present-
ing the DNA evidence in court to obtain relief from the wrongful conviction.55
Every jurisdiction has court rules and statutes that set strict limitations on the time
allowed for post-conviction litigation. 56 Since most post-conviction litigation
based on DNA testing is initiated many years after the original conviction (usually
because DNA technology was not available at the time of trial), all appeals and
post-conviction challenges have been fully litigated or are barred under the local
procedural rules long before the biological evidence is analyzed and can be
presented to the court.57 As a result, courts have no authority to grant any relief.
The only avenue then available to secure the release of a wrongly convicted
prisoner is executive clemency.58 While many exonerees, like Kevin Byrd,
successfully obtained relief from their wrongful convictions by receiving a pardon
84 B.U. L. REv. 125, 125-30 (2004) (discussing prosecutorial practices that thwart post-conviction innocence
claims).
54. Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating prisoner filed civil right suit seeking to force the
prosecutor to grant access to the existing biological evidence for DNA testing); see also SIMON, supra note 28, at
44 (noting in Eduardo Velazquez' case the prosecutor resisted making the evidence available and had to be
ordered by an appellate court to do so); Schultz, supra note 28, at C5 (finding it took two years of legal
maneuvering to get prosecutor to release the biological evidence that was used to exonerate Michael Green who
had already served 11 years in prison for rape); but see Jodi Wilgoren, Prosecutors Use DNA Test to Clear Man In
'85 Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A22 (stating David Sutherlin exonerated when prosecutors in St. Paul,
Minnesota initiated a review of old cases and used DNA testing on old evidence to exonerate him); Smith, supra
note 21, at A04 (discussing Suffolk County, New York prosecutor decision to review criminal convictions to
determine if biological evidence exists that could be used to exonerate); Molvig, supra note 22, at 16, 56
(describing the San Diego District Attorney's Office efforts to review old cases for biological evidence and offer
of free post conviction DNA tests, and describing Austin, Texas prosecutor's cooperation in making evidence
available and paying for testing).
55. See generally Heidi Schmitt, Post-Conviction Remedies Involving The Use of DNA Evidence To Exonerate
Wrongfully Convicted Prisoners: Various Approaches Under Federal and State Law, 70 UMKC L. REV. 1001,
1007-09 (2002) (discussing the procedural obstacles faced by prisoners seeking post-conviction exoneration
through the judicial process).
56. See Diamen v. United States, 725 A.2d 501 (D.C. 1999) (finding post-conviction claim of actual innocence
was time-barred under court's 2-year statute of limitations); Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410-11 (1993)
(discussing the procedural limitations on post-conviction claims in each state); see also George C. Thomas III et
al., Is it Ever Too Late for Innocence? Finality, Efficiency, and Claims of Innocence, 64 U. PiTrr. L. REV. 263,
277-81 (2003).
57. See Death Penalty Overhaul: Hearing before the S. Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong. (2002) (stating,
according to Barry Scheck, co-founder, The Innocence Project, it takes three to five years to screen, evaluate,
investigate and collect the myriad of information needed to file a non-frivolous petition for DNA testing,
especially when inmates are indigent and the evidence is hard to locate); cf Gross et al., supra note 12, at 524
(among the exonerations examined by the authors, more than 50% had served ten or more years in prison prior to
being exonerated, and 80% were incarcerated for at least five years before exoneration and release from
confinement).
58. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 413-17 (rejecting habeas petitions based solely on actual innocence and describing the
clemency process as the "fail safe" for those asserting their actual innocence when the judicial process has been
exhausted); see generally Ryan Dietrich, A Unilateral Hope: Reliance on the Clemency Process As A Right of
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from the governor, 59 pardons are discretionary6° and a wrongly convicted prisoner
could remain in prison for several additional years before receiving a pardon,
especially if the government opposes the clemency petition.6'
Many of the access to the evidence and access to the courts barriers that plagued
post-conviction DNA litigation have been addressed by most innocence protection
statutes that create a statutory right to DNA testing for prisoners, give courts the
power to make existing biological evidence available and grant relief if test results
are exculpatory. Although the forty innocence protection statutes that have been
enacted differ substantially, 62 all of the statutes have some common provisions.
Generally, innocence protection statutes permit a convicted prisoner to petition the
court for DNA testing of biological evidence in the possession of the government,
notwithstanding the expiration of the normal time period for post-conviction
litigation under applicable court rules and local statutes.63 Innocence protection
statutes also authorize the court to order the government to make the still-existing
biological evidence available for DNA testing if the prisoner meets the statutory
qualifications. 64 To qualify for DNA testing under most innocence protection
Access To State-Held DNA Evidence, 62 MD. L. REV. 1028 (2003) (discussing the clemency process in the context
of post-conviction actual innocence claims based on DNA testing).
59. See, e.g., Convicted By Juries, supra note 15, at 35-37, 57-59, 73-74 (stating that because of Virginia's
twenty-one day time limitation on filing post-conviction claims, the only option available for Edward Honaker,
Walter Snyder, and David Vasquez upon receiving exculpatory DNA results was to request a pardon from the
governor).
60. See Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 768 (E.D. Va. 2000) (stating that under the Virginia
constitution, the governor is not required to grant clemency petitions even if the petition presents "compelling
evidence of actual innocence").
6 1. See e.g., Molvig, supra note 22, at 57 (stating that in the case of Earl Washington, even after DNA evidence
established his actual innocence procedural rules barred him from going back to court to seek relief from his
conviction and it took seven years to win a pardon from the governor); see generally, MARGARET EDDS, AN
EXPENDABLE MAN: THE NEAR EXECUTION OF EARL WASHINGTON, JR. (New York University Press 2003)
(describing in detail Earl Washington's case, from his arrest on May 21, 1983, to his release from prison on
February 12, 2001).
62. See Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe Everything You Read: A Review of Modern "Post-Conviction" DNA
Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 355, 358-360 (2002) (discussing the wide array of limitations and restrictions
in different state innocence protection statutes).
63. See e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-102kk(a) (2004) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law
governing post-conviction relief, any person who was convicted of a crime and sentenced to incarceration may, at
any time during the term of incarceration, file a petition with the sentencing court requesting the DNA testing of
any evidence that is in the possession or control of the Division of Criminal Justice .... ").
64. The Innocence Protection Act in Maine typifies the prerequisites for post-conviction DNA testing under
most innocence protection statutes: "The court shall order DNA analysis if [a convicted prisoner] presents prima
facie evidence that: (A) The evidence sought to be analyzed is material to the issue of the person's identity as the
perpetrator of, or accomplice to, the crime that resulted in the conviction; (B) A sample of the evidence is available
for DNA analysis; (C) The evidence to be tested has been subject to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that is
has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced or altered in any material way; (D) The evidence was not
previously subjected to DNA analysis or, if previously analyzed, will be subject to DNA analysis technology that
was not available when the person was convicted; and (E) The identity of the person as the perpetrator of the
crime that resulted in conviction was at issue during the person's trial." ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2138(4)(A)-(E) (2004).
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statutes, the prisoner's petition for testing must aver that the identity of the
perpetrator was a disputed issue at trial, 65 and the petition must include a
declaration that there still exists biological evidence that was collected by the
government in the original investigation 66 which has been maintained by the
government with a proper chain of custody. 67 Finally, the petition for testing must
state that DNA analysis of the evidence would demonstrate that the prisoner is
actually innocent or would not have been convicted. 68 The recently-enacted
Federal Innocence Protection statute has similar provisions.69
2. The Duty to Preserve Evidence
Although innocence protection statutes address some barriers to post-conviction
DNA testing, the overwhelming majority of these statutes have two fundamental
flaws with respect to the preservation of biological evidence. 70 First, the majority
of these statutes do not impose an effective duty on the government to preserve all
biological evidence that could be subjected to post-conviction DNA testing.
Second, among the statutes that impose a duty to preserve evidence, 7' only a few
have adequate statutory provisions to enforce the duty if evidence is intentionally
destroyed. This combination of deficiencies, discussed in turn below, is fatal to the
effective implementation of the remedial goals of innocence protection statutes.
All innocence protection statutes fall into one of three categories with respect to
65. See, e.g., Id. § 2138(4)(E).
66. See, e.g., Id. § 2138(4)(B); see also Commonwealth v. Robinson, 682 A.2d 831, 837 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(holding that in order to establish a prima facie case for DNA testing under state Post Conviction Relief Act,
petition must allege that specimens collected in rape kit are still in existence).
67. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(4)(C).
68. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 590.01(l a)(c) (2004) ("The court shall order that the testing be performed if... the
testing has the scientific potential to produce new, non-cumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's
assertion of actual innocence .. ").
69. Under the Federal Innocence Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600 (2004), prisoners under sentence for a
federal crime can petition for DNA testing if the prisoner files a petition which certifies that the petitioner is
actually innocent of the federal crime that has resulted in their conviction and consents to provide a DNA sample
for comparison analysis. § 3600(a)(1), (a)(9). Second, the petition must allege that the identity of the perpetrator
was a disputed issue at petitioner's trial. § 3600(a)(7). Further, the petitioner cannot put forth a theory of defense
which would fail to establish actual innocence, or a defense which is inconsistent with the defense presented at
trial. § 3600(a)(6). The petition must also assert that the requested forensic analysis will produce "new material
evidence" that would support the proffered defense theory and raise a "reasonable probability" that the applicant
did not commit the offense. § 3600(a)(8). With respect to the biological evidence, the petition for testing must aver
that the evidence was collected as part of the original criminal investigation, has been properly preserved, and
subject to a continuous chain of custody by the government. § 3600 (a)(2), (a)(4).
70. S. REP. No. 107-315 at 19 (2002) (noting that many state innocence protection statutes do not impose a
duty to preserve evidence).
71. In some states, the preservation of biological evidence is incorporated in the innocence protection statute.
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 925.11(4)(a) (2004). In some other jurisdictions the post-conviction preservation of
evidence provision is codified in a separate statute. See, e.g., Mo. STAT. § 650.056 (2004). As discussed herein,
infra Part 2, with regard to the problems of preservation of biological evidence, the criticisms are applicable
irrespective of whether there is a separate provision, or whether the provision occurs within the body of a more
encompassing innocence protection statute.
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preservation of biological evidence needed for DNA testing: no duty to preserve
evidence, a "qualified" duty to preserve evidence, or a "blanket" duty to preserve
evidence .72
a. No-Duty Statutes
The innocence protection statutes enacted in eight states 73 are conspicuously
silent with respect to the duty to preserve biological evidence for post-conviction
DNA analysis. These "no-duty" statutes purport to establish a right to DNA testing
for prisoners, but fail to mandate preservation of the biological evidence needed to
give that right any real meaning. Moreover, with no legal obligation to retain
evidence, the government could effectively nullify the entire innocence protection
statute by systematically destroying all biological evidence in every closed
criminal case pursuant to the local evidence management policy. 74 Thus, in
72. See Swedlow, supra note 62, at 377-80 (describing the various statutory approaches to the preservation of
evidence).
73. 11 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 1I, § 4504 (2005); IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(b) (2004); MINN. STAT. § 590.01-06
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (1-a)(a) (McKinney 2005), OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2953.71-2953.81 (West 2005); W.VA. CODE § 15-2B-14 (2005). The Colorado statute,
COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 18-1-414, expressly states:
(2) A court granting a motion for hearing [on a petition for post-conviction DNA testing] shall
order the appropriate law enforcement agency to preserve existing biological evidence for DNA
testing.
(3) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, this section does not create a
duty to preserve biological evidence nor does it create a liability on the part of a law enforcement
agency for failing to preserve biological evidence.
74. The problems with innocence protection laws that do not impose a clear duty to preserve evidence is aptly
illustrated by People v. Trama, 636 N.Y.S.2d 982 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1995). In Trama. the defendant was convicted of
rape in New York in 1987 but continued to appeal his conviction through the state appellate courts until April
1991. In July 1992, under the New York post-conviction DNA testing statute, the defendant moved for DNA
testing of some of the biological evidence collected in the case that was located at a forensics lab. By October
1992, the motion was served on the government and granted by the court. In October 1993, the government
notified defense counsel that the State Police had destroyed the rape kit and the victim's panties on September 20,
1990, and the remaining physical evidence was destroyed on December 1, 1992. Notably, when the rape kit was
destroyed, Trama was still actively involved in appellate litigation of this conviction and his case was not yet
closed. Also, when the other evidence was destroyed in December 1992, the court had already granted the defense
motion for DNA testing of some of the physical evidence in the case two months earlier, and the litigation was still
on-going.
The court ruled that the government only had a legal duty under New York law to preserve the physical
evidence for thirty days after the defendant's appeal. The court stated that "U]udicial recognition of a right to
post-conviction [DNA testing] ... does not, in and of itself, extend or enlarge the People's duty to preserve
evidence." The court held that the "[e]ven assuming the People's obligation to preserve evidence extended until
the time that the last appellate cour determination was reached on April 3, 1991, 1 find that no legal consequence
flows from the September 20, 1990, destruction of the rape kit, jeans and panties." The court reasoned that "even
where evidence is destroyed during the period in which the People are obligated to preserve it," no relief will be
given to the defendant unless there is a showing that the defendant made a demand for the evidence or "there
existed reason to believe that defendant was seeking discovery of the subject evidence." The court noted that,
despite the filing of the motion for DNA testing, no specific request was made by counsel that any additional
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no-duty jurisdictions the actual right to post conviction DNA testing is left to the
whim of evidence custodians and the fortuity of their inefficiency.
b. "Qualified" Duty Statutes
In eleven jurisdictions,75 the innocence protection statute imposes a "qualified"
duty to preserve evidence. The duty is qualified because it is not triggered until a
petition for DNA testing is filed. The Kansas Innocence Protection statute, for
example, provides: "upon receiving notice of a petition [for post-conviction DNA
testing] . . . , the prosecuting attorney shall take such steps as are necessary to
ensure that any remaining biological material that was secured in connection with
the case is preserved pending the completion of proceedings under this section.' '76
While these qualified-duty statutes provide some measure of protection against
intentional evidence destruction during the post-conviction litigation, a qualified
duty to preserve evidence does not shield biological evidence from destruction
during the time when the evidence is most likely to be destroyed-after the
defendant has been convicted and before the petition for testing is filed. When
biological evidence is destroyed before the qualified duty is triggered, courts have
summarily denied the prisoner's petition for testing on the grounds that the
biological evidence needed for the DNA analysis no longer exists.77 Evidence
custodians in qualified-duty jurisdictions can, therefore, continue to destroy old
biological evidence up until the date a petition for DNA testing is filed.78 In fact,
the decision of the Harris County Clerk's Office to destroy the fifty rape kits
immediately after Kevin Byrd's exoneration would be in full compliance with a
qualified-duty statute if there were no petitions for DNA testing pending in the
other cases.
Moreover, there is an even greater potential for abuse by the government when
the innocence protection statute imposes only a qualified duty to preserve evi-
dence. As discussed above, in order to meet the statutory qualifications for
post-conviction DNA testing, a petition must assert that testable, biological
evidence still exists and a proper chain of custody has been maintained by the
physical evidence in the government's possession be located or preserved. It is unclear from the court's opinion
why the filing of the motion for testing of some of the physical evidence collected in the case would not have been
sufficient notice to the government that all remaining physical evidence collected in the case should be preserved
at least until the pending litigation was resolved.
75. See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2004) ("If a petition is filed ... the court shall order the state to
preserve... all evidence in the state's possession that could be subjected to [DNA] testing."). Accord GA. CODE
ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(10) (2004); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14(1) (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(b)(2) (2003); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 926.1(F) and (H)(3) (West 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. 176.0918(3) (2004); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 9543.1(b)(2) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-304 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-301(5)
(2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1 (A) (2004); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 974.07(5) (West 2003).
76. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(b)(2) (2004).
77. E.g., Johnston v. State, 99 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. App. 2003), discussed infra note 91.
78. See Swedlow, supra note 62, at 379 (2002).
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government. 79 To establish a factual basis for this allegation, the petitioner must
inquire of the government, giving the government ample notice that a petition for
DNA testing is forthcoming and, unfortunately, ample time to destroy the evidence
legally before the petition is filed. 80 Thus, innocence protection statutes that
impose only a qualified duty to preserve evidence fail to guarantee the right to
DNA testing promised by the statute because these statutes do not provide
adequate protection against the lawful destruction of biological evidence.
c. "Blanket" Duty Statutes
The innocence protection statutes in the remaining nineteen states, 81 as well as
the federal and District of Columbia statutes,82 impose a "blanket" duty to preserve
evidence. This duty is the most comprehensive and effective evidence preservation
requirement because the government has an obligation to preserve all biological
evidence that was collected during the initial criminal investigation and properly
79. See supra note 66, Robinson, 682 A.2d at 837.
80. This level of vindictiveness to thwart post-conviction DNA testing is not, unfortunately, farfetched. In the
case of Michael Elliot, the defendant was convicted of murder in 1997 and sentenced to life without the possibility
of parole. In 2002, while investigating Elliot's wrongful conviction claim, the Kentucky Innocence Project
discovered a bloodstain that they believed came from the assailant. The Project hoped that this piece of potentially
valuable evidence, preserved among other physical evidence in the state police department evidence room, could
be subjected to DNA analysis and produce results that would exonerate Elliot. The Project immediately moved to
have the stain preserved. The prosecutor's office not only opposed the motion to preserve the stain, but filed a
motion with the court to have the evidence destroyed before any DNA testing could be conducted. Incredibly, the
trial court granted the government's motion, authorizing the immediate destruction of this untested and potentially
exculpatory evidence. The decision was quickly appealed, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals granted a stay of
the trial court's destruction order. Elliot's defense team then "sped" to the state police evidence facility to serve the
appellate court's order before the evidence was destroyed. See, e.g., Katya Cengel, Kentucky Law Students are
Transforming American Justice, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, KY), June 29, 2003 at I H; Former FBI Director,
William Sessions also noted the egregiousness of the actions taken in the Elliot case, William S. Sessions, DNA
Tests Can Free the Innocent. How Can We Ignore That?, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 2003 at B2; Testimony of Barry
Scheck before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (June 18, 2002) available at http:/
a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/15may2003I230/www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/IO7hrg/866l 7 .p
df).
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1417.9(a) (2005) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law ... the appropriate
governmental entity shall retain all biological material that is secured in connection with a criminal case for the
period of time that any person remains incarcerated in connection with that case."); Accord ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 12-12-104(a)-(b)(1) (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102jj(b) (2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.1l(4)(a) (2004); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-4(a) (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 524.140(3) (2004); MD CODE ANN., CRM. PROC.
§ 8-201(i)(1) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2138(14) (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 770.16(11)
(2005; Mo. STAT. § 650.056 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-21-111 (2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120 (3)
(2004); N.H. STAT. § 651 -D (2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-2(L) (2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1372(A)
(West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-268 (2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1 -11(a) (2004); TEx. CRIM. PRO. art.
38.39(a) (Vernon 2004); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170(4) (West 2004).
82. §3600A (a) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Government shall preserve biological
evidence that was secured in the investigation or prosecution of a Federal offense, if a defendant is under a
sentence of imprisonment for such offense."). See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4134(a) (2004).
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retain that evidence until the prisoner is released from confinement. 83 Unlike the
qualified duty, the blanket duty to preserve evidence is triggered automatically
when there is a conviction and is not contingent upon the filing of a petition for
DNA testing. Blanket-duty statutes also insulate biological evidence from the
haphazard evidence management policies that have resulted in the discretionary
disposal of valuable evidence solely to create additional storage space. Further,
unlike the extremely narrow constitutional duty to preserve evidence, the blanket
statutory duty mandates preservation regardless of good or bad faith and notwith-
standing whether the evidence has an apparent exculpatory value. Thus, innocence
protection statutes that impose a blanket duty to preserve evidence effectively
close the gap between lawful evidence destruction pursuant to evidence manage-
ment policies and the extremely limited constitutional duty to preserve evidence.
Although only half of all innocence protection statutes are blanket-duty statutes,
Congress sought to create a uniform, national standard of blanket preservation of
biological evidence with passage of the Federal Innocence Protection statute.84 To
this end, Congress passed companion legislation creating over $12 million in
DNA-related incentive grants for jurisdictions that have innocence protection laws
with certain minimum provisions.85 To qualify for the federal funds, the thirty-
eight states (and the District of Columbia) that already have innocence protection
statutes must demonstrate that their state law "ensures a reasonable process for
resolving claims of actual innocence" and mandates preservation of biological
evidence "in a manner that ensures that reasonable measures are taken by all
jurisdictions within the State to preserve such evidence."86 While many state
innocence protection statutes will likely meet the "reasonable process" require-
ment, jurisdictions that impose no duty to preserve biological evidence will not
likely meet the preservation requirement. Likewise, jurisdictions with qualified-
duty statutes may be unable to demonstrate that "reasonable measures are taken by
all jurisdictions in the state" to preserve evidence when, in fact, state law imposes
no legal obligation to preserve biological evidence until a petition for DNA testing
is filed. Therefore, many jurisdictions may not qualify for federal funds under
83. If the government seeks to dispose of the evidence at any time before the prisoner's discharge from
custody, the government must provide notice to the prisoner and seek leave of the court, See, e.g., ARK. CODE
ANN. § 12-12-104(c) (2005) ("After a conviction is entered, the prosecuting attorney or law enforcement agency
having custody of the evidence may petition the court with notice to the defendant for entry of an order allowing
disposition of the evidence .... "). See also infra note 115 (discussing statutory procedures for disposal of
oversized pieces of evidence containing biological material).
84. S. Rep. No. 107-315 at 19 (2002) (explaining that the Federal Innocence Protection law is needed to
"ensure appropriate preservation of biological evidence throughout the country." The Committee also noted that
requiring states to adopt "reasonable preservation procedures consistent with the new Federal law" would
safeguard the rights of inmates to produce proof of their innocence through DNA testing and "help law
enforcement retest old cases to catch the actual perpetrators.").
85. 42 U.S.C. § 14136.
86. See id. at §§ 14136 (2)(A)(i)-(B)(i).
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87existing innocence protection statutes.
With respect to the states that had not enacted innocence protection legislation
by the effective date of the federal statute, October 30, 2004, in order to qualify for
the federal funds, the state is required to enact an innocence protection statute with
an evidence preservation provision that is "comparable" to the Federal Innocence
Protection statute.88 While the federal statute does not require states to adopt an
identical preservation provision, it is not likely that a state will qualify for the
federal funds if there is no comprehensive, state-wide duty to preserve biological
evidence, as required in the Federal Innocence Protection Act.
As discussed more fully below, criminal justice officials across the country have
generally opposed the imposition of a statutory duty to preserve evidence.89 While
the potential for substantial federal funds could induce some states to amend their
laws or enact comparable preservation of evidence statutes, it remains to be seen
whether there will soon be a uniform, national standard of blanket preservation of
biological evidence.
In sum, in the twenty-one jurisdictions in which there is either no duty or only a
qualified duty to preserve evidence, innocence protection statutes merely create an
illusory right to post-conviction DNA testing. Blanket-duty preservation statutes
provide the best protection for vital evidence needed for post-conviction DNA
testing. Blanket-duty statutes also ensure that biological evidence can be used to
help the criminal justice system correct the injustice caused by the conviction and
incarceration of innocent people.
3. Statutory Enforcement of the Duty to Preserve Evidence
The second deficiency in innocence protection statutes is that, among the
thirty-two statutes that impose either a qualified or blanket duty to preserve
evidence, the overwhelming majority fail to impose an effective legal remedy for
prisoners if the government intentionally destroys evidence in violation of the
statute.90 These "right-without-a-remedy" statutes have created a gap in the law
that allows the government to violate evidence preservation requirements with
87. See generally Reed. supra note 13, at 886-88.
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14136 (2)(A)(ii)-(B)(ii). See also S. Rep. No. 107-315 at 17-18 (stating that procedures
adopted by a State must, at a minimum, incorporate the core elements of the federal procedure. Specifically, the
Committee noted that a state innocence protection statute which only applied to death row inmates, set
unreasonable time restrictions, or "which would systematically deny testing to whole categories of prisoners"
who would be entitled to testing under the Federal Innocence Protection statute as examples of state statutes
which would not meet the "comparable" requirement).
89. See infra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
90. In fact, the innocence protection statutes in Louisiana, Virginia and Colorado expressly limit the legal
action against the government if the evidence is destroyed in violation of the statute. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
§ 926.1 (H)(6) (2004) ("Except in the case of willful or wanton misconduct or gross negligence, no clerk or law
enforcement agent responsible for preservation shall be held criminally or civilly liable for unavailability or
deterioration if testing cannot be performed"); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1 (E) (2004) ("Nothing in this section
shall create any cause of action for damages against the Commonwealth, or any of its political subdivisions or
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impunity. Courts have very narrowly interpreted these deficient innocence protec-
tion statutes as mere procedural rules that entitle prisoners to no legal remedy
when the destruction of evidence by the government has completely eliminated the
possibility of DNA testing.9' By contrast, the innocence protection statutes in
eleven jurisdictions create criminal penalties if evidence is intentionally destroyed
in violation of the statute or allow courts to impose "appropriate sanctions" to
remedy the statutory violation.
a. Criminal Penalties
The Federal Innocence Protection statute and the innocence protection statutes
enacted in four jurisdictions make the intentional destruction of biological evi-
dence a criminal act.92 While some legal commentators have suggested that the
threat of criminal penalties might deter government actors from intentionally
destroying evidence in violation of the statute,93 the use of criminal penalties is
both inadequate and impractical as the sole remedy for the intentional destruction
officers, employees or agents of the Commonwealth or its political subdivisions."). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 18-1-414(3), supra note 73.
91. Several recent cases illustrate the gap in the law created by post-conviction preservation provisions that
have no enforcement provision when the duty to preserve evidence is breached. In Johnston v. State, 99 S.W.3d
698 (Tex. App. 2003), the defendant was convicted of sexual assault and thereafter filed a petition for DNA testing
under the Texas Innocence Protection statute which imposes a blanket duty to preserve evidence, see TEx. CRIM.
PRO. Ann. art. 38.39(a) (Vernon 2004). The government acknowledged that there was evidence containing
biological material collected in the case, but stated that the evidence was destroyed in the normal course of
business by the police. The appellate court ruled that the blanket preservation statute applied to the evidence
destroyed by the government, id. at 702, but held that, even if the statute was violated, the court could not grant
any relief to Johnston because the statute "does not provide a remedy when the State destroys evidence without
following the procedure outlined in the statute." Id. at 702. The court reasoned that "[flaws that do not amend
substantive law by defining criminal acts or providing penalties are procedural in nature." Id. at 701. The court
concluded that it had no jurisdiction to grant any legal remedy for the government's violation of a mere procedural
rule regarding evidence preservation. See also State v. Brown, 613 S.E.2d 284 (N.C. App. 2005); Chavez v. State,
132 S.W.3d 509, 510 (Tex. App. 2004); Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d 497, 499 (Tex. App. 2002).
92. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-104 (e) (2005) ("It is unlawful for any person to purposely fail to comply
with the provisions of this section .... A person who violates this section is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor");
D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4134(d) (2004) ("Whoever willfully destroys or tampers with evidence that is required to be
preserved under this section with the intent to "impair integrity", "prevent testing" or "prevent production" shall
be subject to a fine of $100,000 or imprisoned for up to 5 years or both."); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/33-5(b) (2004)
("A person who [fails to preserve evidence] is guilty of a Class 4 felony"); W. VA. CODE § 15-2B-13 (a-b) (2005)
("Any person who neglects [to preserve or destroys evidence] is guilty of a misdemeanor... Further, such
neglect constitutes misfeasance in office and may subject that person to removal from office"). The Kentucky
Innocence Protection statute is a hybrid, imposing criminal penalties in non-capital cases, KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.140(6) (2004) (Class D felony), but allowing the court to impose "appropriate sanctions" in capital cases,
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (2004).
93. See Reed, supra note 13, at 898-99 (arguing that civil penalties and criminal sanctions may provide some
measure of deterrence against intentional evidence destruction by evidence custodians); Diana L. Kanon, Will The
Truth Set Them Free? No, But The Lab Might: Statutory Responses To Advancements In DNA Technology, 44
ARtz. L. REV. 467, 492 (2002) (stating criminal penalties may deter destruction of evidence). But see Swedlow,
supra note 62, at 379 (questioning the effectiveness of criminal penalties as a deterrent for evidence custodians
"inclined" to destroy evidence).
1258
EVIDENCE DESTROYED, INNOCENCE LOST
of evidence.
First, under the law in nearly every jurisdiction in the country, intentional
destruction of evidence required to be preserved for future litigation already
constitutes the crime of tampering with evidence. The language in most tampering
with evidence statutes provides that: "[a] person commits the crime of tampering
with physical evidence if, believing that an official proceeding is pending or may
be instituted ... he makes physical evidence unavailable. 94 This language is
broad enough to encompass the pretrial destruction of evidence that could be used
to establish guilt at trial, as well as the post-conviction use of the same evidence to
establish actual innocence. Yet evidence custodians, completely undeterred by the
prospect of criminal charges for tampering with evidence, continue to destroy
evidence with full knowledge that this evidence must be "available" for post-
conviction litigation. Thus, the criminal penalty provisions in innocence protection
statutes merely create a new, duplicative crime and do not significantly reform the
law in a way that will likely halt the destruction of biological evidence pursuant to
existing evidence management policies.
Also, criminal penalty provisions create an inherent conflict for the government.
When a prisoner files a petition for DNA testing, innocence protection statutes give
the local prosecuting authority the right to oppose the petition and ask the court to
deny DNA testing of biological evidence.95 In addition, if an evidence custodian
destroys the very biological evidence that the government did not want tested, the
same prosecutor's office would be responsible for deciding whether to file criminal
charges against the custodian under the innocence protection statute. The decision
to initiate criminal charges is a largely unreviewable, discretionary decision vested
with the prosecution, not the court.9 6 A district attorney's office has the right to
decide for any reason, or for no reason at all, not to prosecute an evidence
custodian for intentionally destroying evidence in violation of the statute. This
gives the government the power to nullify criminal penalty provisions in inno-
94. ALA. CODE § 13A- 10- 129 (2004). Accord ALASKA STAT. § 11.56.610 (2004); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 13-2809
(2004); ARK. CODEANN. § 5-53-111 (b) (2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-610 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a- 155
(2004); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-723(b) (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 918.13(2) (West 2004); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 16-10-94 (2004): HAW. REV. STAT. § 710-1076(3) (2004); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170(4) (2004); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 455(2) (West 2004); Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.100(2) (2004); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 45-7-207(2)
(2004); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-922(3) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 199.220 (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 641:6
(2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:28-6 (West 2005); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.12(B) (West 2004); OR- REV. STAT.
§ 162.295 (2003); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4910 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-16-503(b) (2004); TEx. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 37.09 (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-510.5 (2004).
95. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(5)( 2004 ) ("The motion [for post-conviction DNA testing] shall be
served upon the district attorney and the Attorney General. The state shall file its response, if any, within 60 days
.... The state shall be given notice and an opportunity to respond at any hearing conducted pursuant to this
subsection.").
96. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2(a) (4th ed. 2004) ("The notion that the
prosecuting attorney is vested with a broad range of discretion in deciding when to prosecute and when not to is
firmly entrenched in American law.").
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cence protection statutes in any case where the government opposed DNA testing.
Moreover, even if the prosecutor's office decides to exercise its discretion and
file criminal charges, it would be very difficult in most cases to determine who
should be prosecuted. As discussed above, evidence management practices gener-
ally require evidence custodians to obtain some form of authorization before
evidence is destroyed.9 7 If the custodian follows proper procedures and secures
authorization, it may be very hard to convince a fact finder that the custodian
"willfully" or "intentionally" violated the statutory preservation law. Moreover,
attempting to prosecute the government agent that authorized the destruction
presents other political and practical considerations regarding whether a district
attorney will prosecute a judge who signs an evidence destruction order, or
whether a prosecutor's office will initiate criminal proceedings against one of its
own attorneys for authorizing the destruction of the evidence. As a result, in most
cases where biological evidence is intentionally destroyed the potential defendants
that could be prosecuted under the criminal penalty provisions of an innocence
protection statute may be sufficiently insulated from the reach of the law.
Perhaps the most significant problem with the use of criminal penalties as the
only remedy for the intentional destruction of evidence is the failure to address the
harm caused to the wrongly convicted. 98 Although innocence protection statutes
were specifically enacted to give prisoners access to DNA testing to correct the
injustice of a wrongful conviction,99 these remedial statutes ignore the fact that
destruction of biological evidence in most cases permanently prevents prisoners
from pursuing the only remaining avenue for exoneration. Thus, the use of
criminal penalties to address evidence destruction is, at best, an inadequate and
incomplete remedy because an innocent person may remain in prison or on death
row even if an evidence custodian is prosecuted and convicted. An effective
remedy for the violation of a statute designed to protect the rights of the wrongly
convicted must address the harm suffered by the wrongly convicted when the
statute is violated.
b. "Appropriate Sanctions"
The second type of enforcement provision in innocence protection statutes
provide for "appropriate sanctions" imposed by a court. The Maine Innocence
97. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
98. Several legal scholars have noted this deficiency of criminal penalty provisions. See Nathan T. Kipp,
Preserving Due Process: Violations Of The Wisconsin DNA Evidence Preservation Statutes As Per Se Violations
Of The Fourteenth Amendment, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1245, 1255-58 (2004) (explaining that none of the innocence
protection statutes that provide criminal sanctions as a remedy for evidence destruction specify what remedy will
be available to the prisoner upon violation of the statute); Kanon, supra note 93, at 492-93 (stating criminal
sanctions are of no use to the convicted defendant).
99. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4117 (2004) (stating "[ilt is the intent of the Legislature that wrongfully
convicted persons have an opportunity to establish their innocence through deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA,
testing.").
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Protection statute states: ". . . if the evidence is intentionally destroyed after the
court orders its preservation, the court may impose appropriate sanctions."' 0 0 The
innocence protection statutes in five jurisdictions have "appropriate sanctions"
provisions to enforce the duty to preserve evidence.' 0 ' While these broad statutory
provisions have yet to be interpreted by any court, the plain language gives a judge
discretion to fashion a remedy to redress intentional evidence destruction based on
the facts of each case. Accordingly, a court could conclude that the destruction
of evidence warrants criminal contempt charges against persons responsible for
the evidence destruction. ' 0 2 The court could also decide that an additional sanction
is "appropriate" to address the harm suffered by the prisoner, e.g., dismissal of the
indictment (vacating the conviction),10 3 a sentence reduction, or the grant of a new
trial. Appropriate sanctions provisions have the potential to remedy the destruc-
tion of evidence which prevents the DNA testing envisioned by the statute and
leaves the wrongly convicted with no avenue for exoneration.
In some jurisdictions, however, the court cannot impose appropriate sanctions
unless evidence is intentionally destroyed after the court has issued an order to
preserve the evidence. ' 4 As a result, if an evidence custodian intentionally
destroys evidence in violation of an innocence protection statute, the court could
not impose appropriate sanctions unless there was a court order mandating
preservation of the evidence before the evidence was destroyed. The requirement
of a pre-existing court order is an unnecessary restriction because there would be
100. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2138(2) (2004).
101. ARiZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2004) (stating that "[i]f evidence is intentionally destroyed after the
court orders its preservation, the court may impose appropriate sanctions, including criminal contempt, for a
knowing violation"); IND. CODE § 35-38-7-14(3) (2004) (stating "if evidence is intentionally destroyed after the
court orders its preservation, the court may impose appropriate sanctions"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4120(4) (2004)
(stating that "[i]f evidence is intentionally destroyed after notice of a motion filed pursuant to this section, the
court shall impose appropriate sanctions, including criminal contempt"); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31 -1A-2(F) (2005)
(stating "[t]he district court may impose appropriate sanctions, including dismissal of the petitioner's conviction
or criminal contempt, if the court determines that evidence was intentionally destroyed after issuance of the
court's order to secure evidence"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-409 (2004) (stating "[t]he intentional destruction of
the evidence after the court order may result in appropriate sanctions, including criminal contempt for a knowing
violation"). See also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (2004) (stating that [i]f evidence is intentionally destroyed
[in capital cases] after the court orders preservation, the court may impose appropriate sanctions, including
criminal contempt"): The Model Statute for Obtaining Post Conviction DNA Testing proposed by the Innocence
Project at Cardozo Law School ("Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all appropriate governmental
entities shall retain all items of physical evidence which contain biological material that is secured in connection
with a criminal case .... This requirement shall apply with or without the filing of a petition for post-conviction
DNA testing, as well as during the pendency of proceedings under this Act .... If evidence is intentionally
destroyed after the filing of a petition under this Act, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions on the
responsible parties."), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/Model StatutePostconviction-
DNA.pdf.
102. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-IA-2(F) (2005) (stating "[t]he district court may impose appropriate
sanctions, including dismissal of the petitioner's conviction or criminal contempt, if the court determines that
evidence was intentionally destroyed after issuance of the court's order to secure evidence").
103. Id.
104. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398-400.
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no need for a court to issue an order mandating preservation of evidence if the
innocence protection statute in the jurisdiction imposed a blanket duty to preserve
evidence or if a petition for testing was filed and the government's qualified duty to
preserve evidence was triggered. Thus, to effectively remedy all acts of intentional
evidence destruction, the court should have the authority to impose appropriate
sanctions if evidence has been destroyed in violation of a court order, and/or in
violation of a statutory duty to preserve evidence.
In sum, nearly every innocence protection statute that has been enacted has
evidence preservation deficiencies that undermine the effectiveness of these
statutes in protecting the innocent from wrongful convictions. The innocence
protection statutes in only three states-New Mexico, Maine, and Nebraska-
have blanket preservation of evidence provisions and "appropriate sanctions"
enforcement provisions. The remaining thirty-seven innocence protection statutes
leave innocent people in desperate need of protection from reckless and haphazard
evidence management practices.
II. PRESERVATION OF BIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE As SOUND PUBLIC POLICY
It is now well-established that DNA evidence can be used to prove the identity
of the perpetrator of a crime without the unreliability and human error that can
taint confessions and eyewitness identifications and lead to wrongful convic-
tions. 10 5 Notwithstanding the undisputed power and validity of DNA evidence,
criminal justice officials have mounted fierce resistance to a statutory duty to
preserve biological evidence, citing the fiscal and administrative burden that
preservation would impose. More generally, criminal justice officials argue that
the use of DNA testing in closed cases upsets the government's strong interest in
finality of judgments. These concerns are largely unfounded, and do not outweigh
the paramount interest in the integrity of the criminal justice system advanced by
the preservation of biological evidence.
A. Fiscal and Administrative Burden
Officials in the criminal justice system have steadfastly maintained that the
government should not be saddled with the obligation to preserve biological
evidence after there has been a conviction because it would be too expensive to
105. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 523, 542-46 (2005) (discussing the number of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness error and
false confessions); DWYER, supra note 53 (stating that in a study of sixty-two wrongful convictions false
confessions accounted for 24% of wrongful convictions and mistaken eyewitness identifications resulted in 84%
of wrongful convictions). See also Steven Wisotsky, Miscarriages of Justice: Their Causes and Cures, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 547, 552-53 (1996-97) (discussing eyewitness error); James McClosky, Convicting the Innocent,
8 CRIM. JUSTICE ETHICS 2 (1989) (detailing vivid examples of wrongful convictions based on perjured testimony
secured by police coercion).
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preserve every piece of biological evidence collected in every criminal case.
10 6
Critics also maintain that there is simply no space in overcrowded police property
rooms and evidence storage facilities to accommodate the sheer volume of
evidence-particularly cars, furniture and other bulky items-that would have to
be retained under a blanket duty to preserve evidence.' 0 7 Further, criminal justice
officials contend that the exorbitant cost of properly preserving all biological
evidence in temperature-controlled or refrigerated facilities would be prohibitively
expensive in most jurisdictions.'0 8 Finally, opponents of the duty to preserve
biological evidence argue that, as a matter of policy, the overall administrative
burden occasioned by cataloging, tracking and storing all biological evidence
collected in closed criminal cases is a needless diversion of the government's
scarce resources that could be better utilized in open cases. 109
Contrary to the assertions of criminal justice officials, imposing a blanket duty
to preserve evidence would not result in a great fiscal burden, nor would it cause
administrative disarray in evidence retention. First, there is no biological evidence
recovered in the overwhelming majority of criminal cases." 0 Biological evidence
is recovered primarily in cases involving rape and sexual assault."' In fact, the
majority of the DNA-based exonerations to date have involved underlying charges
106. See, e.g., Florida Moves to Close Window For DNA Appeals, (NPR radio broadcast Aug. 8, 2005)
(recounting statement by Florida prosecutor that preservation of evidence requirement is too broad and
"open-ended"); Waivering Rights: Are Prosecutors Circumventing the New Law Designed to Preserve DNA
Evidence?, Houston Press, July 12, 2001, at 16 (quoting a Texas judge that saving biological evidence in every
case is a "gross waste of resources"; state prosecutor, Bert Graham, reacting to Texas evidence preservation
statute stating, "[w]e almost have to keep everything unless the defense agrees to let us get rid of it. And that could
lead to costly and cumbersome storage problems for the police.") [hereinafter Waivering Rights]; see also
Preserve or Destroy Evidence? Prosecutors, Defense at Odds, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jul. 18, 1993, at A16
(according to an Oakland, California prosecutor "destroying evidence may trouble some people, but the legal
system certainly doesn't have a perpetual obligation to keep things").
107. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 107-315 at 20; John Cheves, Bills Call For Felons'DNA Samples Another Requires
Keeping Evidence, Lexington Herald-Leader. Feb. 12, 2001, at AI (quoting Kentucky prosecutor that it is a
necessity that evidence in criminal cases be destroyed after the appeals process over because "the county doesn't
have enough storage space to hold evidence forever" and noting that in one murder case the government could
have large pieces of evidence like a "couch with blood on it."); NPR, DNA Testing in Crime Cases, supra note 14
(quoting evidence custodian stating that his office handles 90,000 cases per year and "it's just overwhelming when
you have that much evidence. They'd need warehouse after warehouse to keep all of it.").
108. See Cheves, supra note 107. at A7 (discussing prosecutors' concerns over cost of preserving biological
evidence in a climate-controlled storage facility); S. REP. No. 107-315, supra note 52, at 20.
109. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 22, at 561 n.49 (citing prosecutorial concerns over the diversion of the
state's limited DNA testing resources to convicted felons).
110. Convicted By Juries, supra note 15, at xxiii (stating it is unlikely that the perpetrator of a crime will leave
biological material at the crime scene in cases other than sexual assault); John T. Rago, "Truth or Consequences"
and Post-Conviction DNA Testing: Have You Reached Your Verdict?, 107 DICK. L. REv. 845,851-52 (2002-2003)
(estimating that in approximately 80% of serious felony cases there is no biological evidence); see also Findley,
supra note 18, at 22 (stating in most cases the perpetrator does not leave biological evidence).
I 11. See Gross et al., supra note 12, at 529 (examining 144 DNA-based exonerations and finding 105 wrongful
convictions in rape cases, thirty-nine in rape-murder cases, and no wrongful convictions in cases involving drug
offenses, property crimes or other violent crimes).
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of rape or sexual assault. " 2 Moreover, national statistics show that more than 75%
of all crimes reported in the United States are property offenses," 3 crimes that
generally do not involve the recovery of biological evidence. By contrast, rape and
sexual assault cases, where biological evidence is most likely to be recovered,
account for less than 1% of all reported crimes." 4 Thus, even though police
departments and prosecutors must handle hundreds of thousands of cases each
year, the duty to preserve biological evidence will only exist in a very small
percentage of cases.
Second, in order to fulfill its duty to preserve evidence, the government would
not be required to keep and store thousands (or even hundreds) of bulky, oversized
pieces of physical evidence. When biological material is found on large pieces of
evidence, the government would only be required to extract a sample of the
biological material in a sufficient quantity to allow DNA testing." 15 Thereafter, in
accordance with evidence disposal procedures in many innocence protection
statutes, the bulky and oversized physical evidence can be discarded or returned to
the rightful owner. 1
6
Nor would the government incur exorbitant expenses to preserve biological
evidence in costly refrigerated facilities. Under the current state of technology,
DNA analysis can be successfully performed on biological material as long as the
evidence is stored in a dry, dark, air-conditioned room. 17 No costly refrigeration is
required. In fact, the biological evidence successfully analyzed in many DNA
exonerations had previously been stored for many years in un-refrigerated evi-
dence storage rooms. 8
Finally, the duty to preserve biological evidence would require the continued
preservation only of evidence the government has maintained since the initial
investigation of the case." 9 The government would not be required to collect any
new evidence or assume additional responsibilities to preserve the evidence
112. See Convicted By Juries, supra note 15, at xxiii (twenty-six of twenty-eight wrongful convictions profiled
in the landmark Department of Justice study involved analysis of sperm in semen from sexual assault cases).
113. CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2003 STATISTICAL TABLES, tbl.1 available at http:l/
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/cvO4.htm (reporting that there were approximately 24 million crimes reported
nationally in 2004, and approximately 18 million of all reported crimes were property crimes (theft, burglary,
motor vehicle theft) and approximately 209,000 cases of rape and sexual assault-related charges were reported).
114. Id.
115. E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4134(c) (2001) ("The District of Columbia shall not be required to preserve
evidence that must be returned to its rightful owner, or is of such a size, bulk, or physical character as to render
retention impracticable. If practicable, the District of Columbia shall remove and preserve portions of this
material evidence sufficient to permit future DNA testing before returning or disposing of it."); Accord Innocence
Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. §3600A (c)(4)(A)-(B) (Supp. 2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-104 (c)-(d)
(2003); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-4(c)(l)-(2 ) (Supp. 2005); MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (j)(4)(ii)
(Supp. 2004); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-Ia-2 (M)(3)-(4) (Supp. 2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-270.4:1(D) (2004).
116. E.g., D.C. CODE § 22-4134(c) (2001).
117. S. REP. No. 107-315 at 20.
118. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
119. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 22, at 610.
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beyond steps previously taken to preserve the evidence for its own investigative
use. In fact, if the case remained open and unsolved, law enforcement officials
would have continued to preserve the biological evidence until the perpetrator was
identified and prosecuted. Fiscal and administrative concerns do not dictate
whether the criminal justice system preserves biological evidence needed to
prosecute the guilty and should not dictate whether evidence is preserved to
exonerate the innocent.
B. Finality of Judgments
In addition to opposing the duty to preserve evidence based on fiscal and
administrative impracticality, criminal justice officials have argued that allowing
belated actual innocence challenges grossly undermines the government's well-
established interests in finality of judgments120 and providing victim closure.' 2'
These concerns are well-supported by the precedents of the United States Supreme
Court. 122 The Court has stated that "neither innocence nor just punishment can be
vindicated until the final judgment is known . .. without finality, the criminal law
is deprived of much of its deterrent effect."' 123 The Court has also stated that
"[o]nly with an assurance of real finality can the State execute its moral
judgment in a case. Only with real finality can the victims of crime move
forward knowing the moral judgment will be carried out.... To unsettle these
expectations is to inflict a profound injury to the 'powerful and legitimate
interest in punishing the guilty.
''124
Thus, when confronted with requests for federal habeas corpus review of a state
court conviction, the Court has held that "[i]n the absence of a strong showing of
'actual innocence' . . . the state's interest in actual finality outweigh the prisoner's
interest in obtaining yet another opportunity for [post-conviction] review."'
125
Applying the interest in finality of judgments to post-conviction DNA testing,
120. Adam Liptak, Prosecutor's See Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases. N.Y. TIMES. Feb. 24, 2003, at Al
(quoting Missouri Attorney General, Jeremiah W. Dixon: "[ils the state required to prove every day that someone
committed an offense beyond a reasonable doubt?" Also, Jamie Orenstein, former Department of Justice official
stated: "[slociety has a real and legitimate need for finality in answering the question of whether someone is guilty
of a crime." Josh Marquis, Oregon Prosecutor, argued that "[tihere are circumstances where enough is enough...
at some point there has to be finality.").
121. See also Louis Romano, When DNA Meets Death Row, It S the System That's Tested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12,
2003 at Al (stating prosecutors oppose DNA testing because of concern for the victims' relatives, who have
waited years-sometimes decades-for closure); Liptak, supra note 120. at A 16 (quoting Joshua Marquis of the
National District Attorneys Association, "[c]onversations with victims' families about these [DNA] motions are
not easy for prosecutors ... every Prosecutor dreads making a phone call to a victim after the victim thinks the
case is over.... you're reopening the wound.").
122. Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 554-556 (1998), and cases cited therein.
123. id. at 555 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)); see also, Herrera, 506 US at 403-05.
124. Calderon, 523 U.S. at 556 (citing Herrera, 506 U.S. at 421, O'Connor, J. concurring).
125. Calderon. 523 U.S. at 557 (citing Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986)).
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criminal justice officials argue that finality must trump the very human desire of
the convicted to perpetually seek their freedom through every available avenue,
including subjecting old evidence to DNA testing and other technologies that
might become available. 
1 2 6
While the government's interest in finality of judgments is strong enough to
block some post-conviction petitions for review,' 2 7 that interest should be signifi-
cantly weaker when asserted in the context of petitions for post-conviction DNA
testing. 128  The principle of finality of judgments is based, in part, on two
closely-related assumptions. The first assumption is that the original trial was an
accurate fact-finding process that resulted in a fair and reliable guilty verdict. 
129
The second assumption is that, given the full panoply of constitutional rights given
the accused, the chance of an erroneous conviction is so remote that additional
post-conviction litigation will not likely yield any different result. 130 With 163
exonerations to date, however, it is now beyond dispute that innocent people are in
fact convicted at trial, and post-conviction DNA analysis can and does expose
these miscarriages of justice many years after the judgment of conviction is
declared to be final by the justice system. The dispositive nature of DNA analysis
thoroughly uproots the foundation of finality as a basis for the government's
staunch opposition to the duty to preserve biological evidence. Where biological
evidence can be used to definitively identify the true perpetrator, DNA technology
redefines the point at which the justice system should fairly declare that a judgment
is final.
126. See Romano, supra note 121, at A14 (arguing against post-conviction testing, one Virginia prosecutor
states: "What do we do about it in 10 years-when more sophisticated technology comes up? Do we test it again?
When does this Pandora's box stop opening?"); see also Thomas et al., supra note 56, at 293-94 (arguing that
finality is needed because "prisoners would endlessly search for scraps of new evidence and bombard the courts
with petitions to reopen their cases").
127. See generally Calderon, 523 U.S. at 538 (recognizing that the state's interest in finality ofjudgment limits
the courts' discretion in granting habeaus corpus petitions); Herrera 506 U.S. at 390 (1993) (holding that a claim
of actual innocence based on new evidence is not grounds for a habeas corpus petition in the absence of a
constitutional claim).
128. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the state's interest in finality of judgments "must
yield to the imperative of correcting a fundamentally unjust incarceration." Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 135
(1982). See also Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986) (stating that an "extraordinary case" where an
innocent person has been convicted, the court will consider granting habeas relief to correct a fundamental
miscarriage of justice).
129. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398-400 (stating that once the accused has been accorded all constitutional rights
and convicted at a trial the presumption of innocence disappears and the post-conviction petitioner is presumed
guilty).
130. Id. at 403-04 ("[T]here is no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination would be any more exact
[in a subsequent trial with additional evidence]. To the contrary, the passage of time only diminishes the reliability
of criminal adjudications."). See also id. at 420 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Our society has a high degree of
confidence in its criminal trials, in no small part because the Constitution offers unparalleled protections against
convicting the innocent"). See also Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We
Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 1317, 1332-34 (1997) (asserting that critics of post-conviction
litigation do not believe that the innocent would be initially convicted).
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Further, the Court has recognized that the government's interest in finality is not
absolute and must yield if there is a "truly persuasive demonstration of actual
innocence."' 31 Few would dispute that DNA analysis that excludes a prisoner as
the possible perpetrator is a "truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence"
in most cases. The failure to impose a legal duty to preserve biological evidence
has stopped and will continue to stop the wrongly convicted from making a truly
persuasive demonstration of actual innocence. The government's strong interest in
finality of judgments simply does not vest the government with the power to
destroy critical evidence which could be used to discredit the verdict reached at
trial and then simultaneously declare that the judgment is final and the litigation is
over.
In addition to the interest of courts in punishing the guilty, finality of judgments
protects the government's interest in providing closure to crime victims. While
convicting innocent people of crimes significantly undermines the goal of provid-
ing victim closure, preservation of biological evidence is consistent with the
interests of victims because it ensures that victims are not given a false sense of
closure. Crime victims and their families cannot and do not receive real closure if
an innocent person is convicted and the actual perpetrator is free in the community
to re-offend. If the DNA testing confirms the guilt of the prisoner, the case is
usually closed without the need for further court proceedings or involvement of
victims. Indeed, in nearly half of all the DNA-based post-conviction challenges,
the DNA test confirms the prisoner as the perpetrator and the case is closed.
132
Alternatively, if DNA testing excludes the prisoner as the source of the biological
evidence, the same biological material can be used to correctly identify the actual
perpetrator and provide victims with the real closure they deserve. In fact,
following many DNA-based exonerations, the government has been able to finally
identify the actual perpetrator.
133
13 1. Herrera, 506 U.S at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132. Peter J. McQuillan, DNA News, INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at InnocenceProject.org/dnanews/index
(last visited Sept. 9, 2005) (stating that half of the post-conviction DNA tests implicate the convicted prisoner).
See also Richard Willing, Justice Department: DNA Tests for Guilty Jam System: Authorities Don't Want Petitions
to Be Made Easier, USA TODAY, May 13, 2004, at 18A (stating Ricky McGinn was granted DNA testing by
Governor Bush and DNA tests confirmed his guilt. In addition, Benjamin LaGuer was convicted in Massachu-
setts, attracted popular support, and his guilt was confirmed after supporters raised $30,000 to pay for DNA
testing.).
133. See SIMON, The Innocents, supra note 28 (stating that the biological evidence used to exonerate the
wrongly convicted was also used to locate the actual perpetrator of the crime in many cases, including Kirk
Bloodsworth, Anthony Robinson, Darryl Hunt, Larry Youngblood, Ronald Cotton, Kevin Green, Jeffrey Pierce,
Rona Williamson, Dennis Fritz, and Marvin Anderson). See also Associated Press, "Man Sues Over Wrongful
Convictions," Oct. 1, 2002 (when DNA testing completed in Earl Washington's case, "a DNA 'cold hit' linked a
man already serving time for rape" to the murder that Washington had been convicted of); Louis Romano, When
DNA Meets Death Row, It's the System That's Tested, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2003 at A 14 (showing that Frank Lee
Smith died of cancer on Florida's death row before the DNA test result exonerated him, but eleven months later,
the DNA evidence was used to identify a convicted rapist and murderer as the actual perpetrator of the crime);
Editorial, States Dawdle While Jailed Innocents Languish, USA TODAY, June 26, 2001, at 12A (noting Jerry Frank
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Moreover, the government's interests in finality of judgments and providing
victim closure must be balanced against the greater societal interest in the integrity
of the criminal justice system. Without question, the integrity of the criminal
justice system has been tarnished by the number of exonerations in recent years.'
34
According to recent Department of Justice data, less than half of Americans have
solid confidence in the criminal justice system. 135 Also, the number of Americans
that oppose the death penalty today because of the potential of a wrongful
conviction has more than doubled. 136 The retention of biological evidence for
post-conviction DNA testing is a necessary step towards restoring public confi-
dence in the criminal justice system. The duty to preserve evidence provides some
assurance to a doubtful public that while innocent people may be convicted, the
criminal justice system will not perpetuate the injustice by permitting the destruc-
tion of potentially exculpatory evidence and allowing an innocent person to
languish in prison or face execution.
The clash between evidence destruction and actual innocence will not end when
the remaining biological evidence in all closed criminal cases has been subjected
to DNA testing. Some legal scholars have opined that issues surrounding the
preservation of biological evidence will eventually disappear as the government
will have all biological evidence subjected to DNA analysis during the pretrial
phase of a case. t 37 This view of the criminal justice system is probably overly
optimistic. While it is true that there are a finite number of old, "pre-DNA" cases
with biological evidence still remaining, there are simply too many flaws in our
Townsend was convicted on several murder charges in Florida and was later exonerated when DNA testing on
biological evidence pointed to an institutionalized mental patient).
134. Morning Edition: DNA Testing in Crime Cases Causing Distrust in the Criminal Justice System (NPR
radio broadcast Aug. 29, 2000) (reporting that, according to local attorney, headlines about DNA exonerations
were making potential Texas jurors consider the fallibility of the criminal justice system). See Romano, supra note
133, at A14 ("Prosecutors and defense lawyers agree that the spate of well-publicized wrongful convictions
uncovered by DNA testing has taken its toll on the [criminal justice] system.").
135. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTIcs-2002 116, tbl.2.12
(Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2003). The data showed that 29% of people had a "great deal" or "quite
a lot" of confidence in the criminal justice system; the remaining 71% of people stated that they had only "some,"
'very little," or "[no]" confidence in the criminal justice system.
136. In 1991, only 11% of people listed the possibility of wrongful conviction as their reason for opposing the
death penalty. By 2003, 25% of people opposed the death penalty because of the possibility of wrongful
conviction. Id. at 148, tbl. 2.54. Conversely, Americans overwhelmingly support re-opening old cases to allow
prisoners to obtain DNA testing on old biological evidence. See Mark Gillespie, Americans Favor DNA "Second
Chance" Testing for Convicts, Gallup News Service, March 30, 2000 (reporting that a survey in 2000 showed that
92% of Americans-of all demographic and political ideologies-believe that prisoners should be allowed to get
DNA tests if such tests might prove their innocence).
137. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 22, at 611 ("[A]s time goes by the universe of cases where blood or
semen samples were not initially tested will diminish."); Liptak, supra note 120, at A15 ("The impact of [DNA
evidence] may be a limited and passing phenomenon. DNA testing at the outset of a prosecution is now routine, so
that more recent convictions will not be subject to the challenges on this basis."); Mark Hansen, DNA Bill of
Rights, A.B.A. J., March 2000, at 30, 31 (quoting Professor James Starts that the Innocence Projects "will
eventually put themselves out of business" because there will be no more old evidence to test).
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justice system to assume that, henceforth, DNA testing will be utilized in every
case where there is biological evidence.
As Professor Givelber aptly observed, if the prosecutor believes that the
government can prove its case on the strength of the testimony of the victim and
other witnesses, the government would be under no obligation to submit biological
evidence for DNA testing simply because such evidence exists. 138 In fact, in an
effort to preclude post-conviction DNA testing requests, a prosecutor's office
recently began trying to require defendants to waive the preservation of biological
evidence as a prerequisite of getting a favorable plea offer. 139 Also, the defense
will not seek pretrial DNA testing in every case in which biological evidence
exists. While DNA testing is now available pretrial, it is still out of reach for many
indigent defendants who are represented by grossly under-funded public defender
offices and court-appointed counsel. 140 Moreover, in many jurisdictions, the trial
court has the power to refuse defense requests for DNA testing and related expert
services. 14' If the court denies the request, the indigent defendant will be forced to
proceed to trial without the potential benefit of dispositive DNA test results. 
142
CONCLUSION
If there was no realistic probability that DNA analysis of biological evidence
could prove actual innocence, the government's opposition to a duty to preserve
biological evidence for post-conviction DNA testing would have some legitimacy.
After 163 exonerations, however, our criminal justice system has revealed itself to
be as fallible as the human beings who occupy the bench, populate the jury box,
take the witness stand, and sit at the counsel table. Innocence protection statutes
are nothing more than an empty promise and do little to actually protect innocence
unless these statutes impose a blanket duty to preserve evidence and empower the
court to impose sanctions that meaningfully address the harm suffered by the
wrongly convicted when evidence is intentionally destroyed. While the blanket
duty to preserve evidence will require some additional government resources, the
138. Givelber, supra note 130, at 1376 ("The weaker the prosecution's case, the more likely that the prosecutor
will seek additional evidence from DNA testing. The corollary is that the stronger the prosecution's case, the less
likely the prosecutor will use DNA testing.").
139. Lauren Kern, Waivering Rights: Are Prosecutors Circumventing the New Law Designed to Preserve DNA
Evidence?, HOUSTON PRESS. July 12, 2001, at 16.
140. AM. BAR ASS'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/
defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf (discussing the current abysmal state of funding and resources available
for indigent defense representation throughout the country).
141. Am. BAR ASs'N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, A COMPREHENSIVE OVERVIEW
OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN VIRGINIA 60 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/
indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf (reporting on the high standard set in Virginia courts for indigent defendants to
receive expert assistance); Givelber, supra note 130, at 1376 (asserting that a defendant's ability to secure DNA
testing is subject to the court's willingness to order testing).
142. Givelber, supra note 130, at 1376.
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actual cost is negligible when measured against the tax dollars wasted to incarcer-
ate an innocent person for a decade or longer, and the additional tax dollars that
will be justly used to compensate exonerated prisoners. The most important
function of the criminal justice system has always been to reliably convict the
guilty and never convict the innocent. We must have zero tolerance for even honest
mistakes that result in the conviction of the innocent, especially when we can
identify the mistakes and correct them. Whatever our sense of justice and fairness
is, we can achieve neither if we lock up innocent people and then, quite literally,
throw away the key to their freedom.
